

11 March 1980

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Dear John:

In line with the recently imposed mandate to develop the airlift requirements 1960 through 1970, the writer has done some independent soul searching and, in addition, has talked with the various segments of [REDACTED] staff which is CA/P&I. This soul searching and the resultant discussions have indicated that there are a number of areas within the DD/P, each operating within its own little vacuum.

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For an example, it was the concerted opinion in the CA/P&I staff that any attempt to forecast even five years in the future was, to all intents and purposes, a useless operation. Their reaction was that in the cold war bonfire area, limited to very small geographic areas, the 5,000 man airdrop pack located at [REDACTED] respectively, would be adequate to take care of such outbreaks which would hopefully be successfully dealt with within a maximum of thirty days. These type operations would envisage the normal guerrilla action or, in other words, light infantry type activity involving the minimum from an airlift point of view. It should be emphasized that these packages are already in being in the locations specified above.

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In the event of the invocation of need for employment of cold war contingency asset requirements, each of the foregoing areas would be at least doubled from a manpower point of view and would envisage insertion of much heavier equipment varying on that consistent with a division, including both infantry and armored activity. In this latter case, which very likely would be preshielded to general warfare, it is expected that the Department of Defense would provide that support necessary to hopefully assure successful operations of this magnitude. Therefore, Agency air assets would be an insignificant factor in providing such support.

In my opinion, one of the most important things resulting from the foregoing discussions in connection with an attempt to forecast Agency airlift requirements over a ten year period are as follows:

- A. Such a forecast is impractical in that no other segments of the Agency who would be expected to generate airlift requirements are following any such pattern.
- B. Several segments of the Agency including DFD are each operating within their own local vacuum.

It is, therefore, my opinion and, as a result, my recommendation, which has been discussed with [REDACTED] that within the DFD area there be established a true war planning activity which would represent all of the operational segments of the Agency. To function on a daily basis forecasting the Agency plans and needs which would be the result of Agency intelligence forecasts. This would envisage a day to day re-evaluation of the Agency requirements based on changes in intelligence forecasts. The personnel assigned to such a venture to be on a full time basis and certainly it goes without saying that DFD should be represented in such an activity.

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It must be emphasized that this is pointed toward cold war plans as opposed to the existing hot war planning organization. This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that CIA has a predominant cold war responsibility as levied upon this Agency by various NSC documents. Such concentration of effort and assured coordination in the planning cycle will alleviate the current vacuum areas which now exist, each operating independently one from the other, and will guarantee that future CIA reaction is timely and, therefore, will be successful in the accomplishment of cold war objectives.

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